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Highlights  Empirical analysis of the effect of natural resources on fiscal decentralization.   Resource discovery has very little effect on revenue decentralization but induces 
expenditure centralization.   Oil discovery the main driver of centralization and not mineral discovery.  Resource discovery leads to centralization in countries without permanent democratization.  Tax and intergovernmental transfers respond most to resource discovery and 
democratization whereas own source revenue, property tax, educational expenditure, and 
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Abstract: If the central government is a revenue maximizing Leviathan then resource 
discovery and democratization should have discernible impacts on the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. We systematically explore these effects by exploiting exogenous variation 
in giant oil and mineral discoveries and permanent democratization. Using a global dataset of 
77 countries over the period 1970 to 2012 we find that resource discovery has very little 
effect on revenue decentralization but induces expenditure centralization. Oil discovery 
appears to be the main driver of centralization and not minerals. Resource discovery leads to 
centralization in locations which have not experienced permanent democratization.  Tax and 
intergovernmental transfers respond most to resource discovery shocks and democratization 
whereas own source revenue, property tax, educational expenditure, and health expenditure 
do not seem to be affected. Higher resource rent leads to more centralization and the effect is 
moderated by democratization. 
JEL classification: H41, H70, O11 
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1  Introduction 
 
Haggling over a fair share of tax revenue between the central and the provincial governments 
is often an integral part of the political theatre in many countries. Natural resource revenue 
for its part plays a crucial role in influencing the politics of revenue sharing. Whether the 
issue at hand is fiscal federalism or autonomy or secession, the geographic location and the 
distribution of natural resource revenue seems to play a role. For example, the discovery of 
North Sea oil off the coast of Scotland has underpinned the Scottish case for sovereignty 
since the 1970s. North Sea oil was an integral part of the political discourse on either side of 
the Scottish independence referendum debate in the UK in 2015.3 The same could also be 
said about the secession movement of the three mini Indian states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh 
and Uttarakhand. These three mini states split from the three large states of Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh respectively in the year 2000 and they also happen to be endowed 
with one of the largest mineral deposits in the country. Bolivian indigenous communities of 
the Aymaras and the Quechuas not receiving a fair share of the natural gas revenue sparked 
mass protests and political instability in the country which led to the nationalisation of gas 
fields in 2005.     
In spite of the potential connections, research on the interrelationship between natural 
resources and fiscal decentralization remain rare. Standard models of fiscal decentralization 
assume benevolent governments at the central and regional levels (see Alesina and Spolaore, 
1997; Oates, 1999; and Besley and Coate, 2003). They maximize the sum of utilities of 
residents in their jurisdiction and provide local public goods. Therefore, there is merit in 
fiscal decentralization or centralization depending on the nature of externality that the 
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 On 25 August, 2015 Venessa Barford of the BBC writes in her article entitled Scottish Independence: 
Five Unresolved Questions for the BBC Online, “North Sea oil and gas reserves are another matter of much 
dispute. Mr Salmond says an independent Scotland would earmark a tenth of revenues - which the Yes 
campaign puts at about £1bn a year - to form a Norwegian-style sovereign wealth fund, creating a £30bn pot 
over a generation. Prime Minister David Cameron says the North Sea has been a British success story – and now 





















provision of local public goods generates for other regions in the country. Alternatively, 
another class of models view fiscal decentralization from a „Neo-Hobbesian‟ perspective 
whereby the central government is a revenue maximizing Leviathan only constrained by the 
constitution and bottom-up democratic pressure via the regional governments (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1977). Under both of these approaches, one would expect the spatial distribution 
of natural resources and the quality of political institutions to matter by influencing the power 
relationship between the central and the regional governments. In particular, a revenue 
maximising Leviathan in the form of the central government is always expected to prefer 
fiscal centralization. However, their ability to achieve fiscal centralization could be 
constrained by democratic pressure and the capacity to tax. In spite of the potential 
connections, studying the effects of natural resources and political institutions on fiscal 
decentralization remains on the periphery of this literature.  
In this paper we aim to systematically explore the causal effect of natural resources on 
fiscal decentralization and how the quality of political institutions affects this relationship. In 
particular, we exploit the exogenous variation in giant and supergiant discoveries in oil, gas 
and mineral reserves to set up a quasi-natural experiment to identify the effect of natural 
resources on fiscal decentralization. The effect of resource discovery as an exogenous news 
shock is analysed using a global dataset covering up to 77 countries over the period 1970 to 
2012. Furthermore, the paper also estimates the effect of resource rent on fiscal 
decentralization.   
The paper makes the following contributions. First, establishing causality is the main 
motivation in this literature and the paper presents a strategy to achieve that objective by 
using the exogenous news shock of resource discovery as an identifier. Second, the paper 




















distinguish between minerals4 and oil discoveries. Third, the paper analyses the effect of 
resource discovery on the politics of fiscal decentralization. In particular, it explores how 
democratization influences the relationship between resource discovery and fiscal 
decentralization.     
There is no obvious prior when it comes to the effect of natural resources on fiscal 
decentralization. On the one hand resource discovery could embolden a central government 
who is acting as a revenue maximizing Leviathan to act far more unilaterally and centralize 
fiscal affairs. On the other hand resource discovery could also incentivize the central 
government to decentralize in order to either expand political patronage or improve the 
efficiency of public spending by addressing the preference matching problem5. Therefore, the 
lack of a strong prior either way makes this a valid empirical question. Estimating a model 
controlling for country specific unobserved heterogeneity and trends, time varying common 
shocks, discovery history in the previous decade, GDP per capita, and heterogeneity in the 
measurement of fiscal decentralization we find that resource discovery (both oil and 
minerals) has very little effect on fiscal decentralization from the revenue side. However, the 
former appears to induce centralization on the expenditure side and the effect seems to be 
driven by oil discovery and not minerals. The intertemporal effect of resource discovery on 
revenue decentralization (measured by revenue share) appears to be statistically insignificant 
both 10 years pre-and-post discovery. However on the expenditure side we find evidence of 
expenditure concentration up to 6 years post discovery. We also document that permanent 
democratization and the quality of political institutions have a differential impact on the 
effect of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization. In particular, we find that resource 
discovery leads to fiscal centralization in locations which have not experienced permanent 
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 The minerals are gold, silver, platinum group elements (PGE), copper, nickel, zinc, lead, cobalt, 
molybdenum, tungsten, uranium oxide.   
5
 The preference matching problem refers to the mismatch in preference between the local population 




















democratic transition.  This effect is primarily driven by oil discovery. We note similar but 
statistically insignificant trends with mineral discovery. Which fiscal institutions respond 
most to the resource discovery news shock and democratization? We find that tax and 
intergovernmental transfers respond most to the shocks of resource discovery and 
democratization. The institutions of own source revenue, property tax, educational 
expenditure, and health expenditure do not seem to be significantly affected. The discovery 
news shock might affect government revenue and spending through expectations but any 
direct effects on revenue collection have to wait till the start of production. This is after 
accounting for the possibility of debt overhang as central governments can borrow post 
discovery. The marginal impact of resource rent could be much more immediate and direct. 
Using both the standard fixed effects model and the instrumental variable (IV) method we 
find higher resource rent leads to more fiscal centralization and the effect is moderated by 
permanent democratization. This pattern is observed for both oil and mineral rents even 
though the effect is albeit weak for the latter.   
Our identification strategy relies on the exogenous variation in the discovery dates of 
giant and supergiant mineral and oil deposits.6 Note that natural gas deposit discoveries are 
bundled with oil throughout the paper and referred to as „oil discovery‟. Our dataset codes a 
mineral deposit as giant if it has the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual 
revenue for 20 years or more accounting for fluctuations in commodity price. A giant oil 
or/and gas (including condensate) field is a deposit that contains at least a total of 500 million 
barrels of ultimate recoverable oil or gas equivalent. This would be able to generate an annual 
revenue stream of approximately USD 0.4 billion under the assumptions that over the sample 
period the average gestation lag between production and discovery is 5 years, the average 
price of a barrel is USD 25, and the average discount rate including the country specific risk 
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 Our identification strategy is similar to Cotet and Tsui (2013), Lei and Michaels (2014), and Arezki et 
al. (2014). These studies use giant oil discovery as an exogenous news shock to identify the effect of oil on 




















premium is 10 percent.7 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that both the giant oil and 
mineral discovery shocks are approximately of the same size on average. However, it is 
important to note that the value of discoveries are estimates and the projections are reliant on 
the estimation of the value at the time of the discovery. These estimates are often revised in 
subsequent years. The ultimately recoverable deposit could also change if there is a major 
shift in technology. Therefore, discoveries are better treated as exogenous news shock rather 
than a projection based expected revenue shock.  
Geological data collected using modern equipment could locate with a finite margin 
of error the area where mineral or oil deposits are most likely to be found. However, it is not 
possible to accurately predict the timing of a giant or supergiant discovery. Giant and 
supergiant discoveries are rare and therefore, the discovery dates are likely to be exogenous. 
One might argue that politicians and the government could manipulate the announcement of 
the precise timing of discovery to gain political mileage. Both the Mike Horn dataset on oil 
discovery and the MinEx Consulting dataset on mineral discovery are immune to such 
possibilities as the reported discovery dates are independently verified and documented using 
multiple industry sources and not just government records. 
Exploration effort could drive resource discovery in a country. We partially control 
for exploration effort by introducing a past discovery variable in our specification which 
accounts for any discovery of natural resources in that country during the previous decade. 
Exploration effort is likely to be positively correlated with past discovery. Furthermore, it is 
reasonable to expect that factors affecting the likelihood of resource discovery are either 
time-invariant or time-trending. Therefore, resource discoveries are likely to be exogenous 
conditional on our control vector of country fixed effects and linear trends. Nevertheless, we 
follow Cotet and Tsui (2013) and also control for wildcat drilling as a measure of exploration 
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 Some studies claim that the risk premium augmented discount rate should be as high as 14-15 
percent. Arezki at al. (2014) presents a more sophisticated analysis of net present value of giant oil discoveries 




















intensity and our results are robust. Note that wildcat drilling is the number of oil wells 
drilled in an area where no oil production exists. The inclusion of wildcat drilling as an 
additional control reduces the sample size by more than half and therefore is not our preferred 
control variable. These results are reported in the Supplementary Material file. 
Resource discovery could be driven by factors other than exploration effort. Hence, 
we estimate logit models with resource discovery as the dependent variable and find that no 
macroeconomic and political variables predict resource discovery. These issues are discussed 
further in section 3.  
We interpret our result as an expectation induced fiscal regime shift following a 
discovery news shock. An alternative interpretation could be that resource discoveries 
trigger cash flow changes at the different levels of government and not fiscal 
decentralization. The latter interpretation depends on the assumption that countries 
with pre-existing decentralized fiscal framework would levy tax on natural 
resources at the sub-national level. Australia and Indonesia are examples of such fiscal 
arrangements. Even though plausible, such decentralized fiscal arrangements are not a 
norm in resource rich countries. In fact a large majority of the oil rich nations in the Middle 
East and North Africa, Northern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe tax resource 
revenue at the national level. This suggests that the expectation induced fiscal regime shift 
interpretation is more likely. However, we are unable to empirically rule out the possibility of 
a cash flow effect.  
The literature on natural resources and fiscal decentralization is surprisingly small 
even though one would expect natural resources to play a role in the bargaining game over 
fiscal control between the central and the provincial governments. However, there is a 
sizeable literature on the determinants of fiscal decentralization. This literature is dominated 




















decentralization. These include colonial history, federal status, taste heterogeneity and 
geographical size. For example, Alesina et al. (1996) and Panizza (1999) presents theoretical 
models which identifies democracy; high income per capita; country size; and taste 
heterogeneity across regions within a country as determinants of fiscal decentralization. 
These predictions are then confirmed by regression model estimates using cross-section data. 
In contrast, Pommerehne (1977) and Bodman and Ford (2006) finds population density to be 
the main predictor of fiscal decentralization.  
There is also a sizeable literature on the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization. For 
example, in a more recent study Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) test the effectiveness of 
fiscal decentralization on economic growth, quality of government, and public goods 
provision using cross-section and panel data from a sample of 75 developing and transitional 
economies over 25 years. Their work is an empirical test of the Riker (1964) theory that the 
results of fiscal decentralization depends on the degree of political centralization. Indeed they 
find empirical support for the Riker theory. In a related paper Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) 
examine the effect of fiscal federalism under political centralization. 
Our paper is related to a large theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization. 
Lockwood (2005) presents an excellent survey of this literature. The standard model in this 
literature assumes that all levels of government are utility maximizing benevolent social 
planners. This approach is underpinned by the pioneering work of Oates (1972) and since 
developed by a number of authors. In contrast the political economy approach stems from the 
work of „Brennan and Buchanan‟. They view the process of fiscal decentralization as the 
imposition of democratic control on the central government which is a revenue maximizing 
Leviathan.  
In a related research Mulligan and Tsui (2015) examine the theoretical foundations of 




















non-democracies are constrained by their ability to tax. Based on their model, one could very 
well envisage resource discovery to have an effect on the ability to tax in particular and fiscal 
decentralization in general.   
Our paper is also related to a large literature on resource curse. This literature notes 
that resource rich countries on average grow much slower than resource poor countries8. 
Subsequent studies have argued that whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing 
depends on country-specific circumstances especially institutional quality (eg., Mehlum et al., 
2006; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010, 2014; Bhattacharyya and Collier, 2014), natural 
resource type (Isham et al., 2005) and ethnic fractionalisation (Hodler, 2006).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical 
strategy and data. Section 3 presents evidence on the effects of resource discovery and rent on 
fiscal decentralization. It also examines the intertemporal effects of resource discovery on 
fiscal decentralization, how democratization affects the relationship between resource 
discovery and fiscal decentralization, and any potential heterogeneity in the relationship 
across resource types (oil and minerals) and fiscal commitments (transfers, property tax, 
education, health etc.). Section 4 concludes. 
2 Empirical Strategy 
 
We use a panel dataset covering 77 countries observed over the period 1970 to 2012.9 To 
estimate the effects of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization, we use the following 
model:  
 1 1 2= 10it j i it j it it itt i itDFD t M RD Y           X              (1) 
 where it jFD   is the fiscal decentralization variable in country i  in the year t j , i  is the 
country fixed effects, t  is a year dummy variable controlling for time varying common 
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 See van der Ploeg (2011) for a survey of this literature. 
9
 Due to data limitations, not all specifications cover 77 countries. In most specifications, the panel is 




















shocks, it  are country specific time trends. it jM  is a method dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 if the fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis and 0 if it is 
reported using cash basis. The method dummy accounts for any potential systematic variation 
in the data due to the definition of fiscal decentralization. Note that itRD  is an indicator of 
resource discovery in country i  in year t  and 10itYD  is the number of years with resource 
discoveries in the last ten years (from 10t   to 1t  ). The 10itYD  variable accounts for the 
past history of discovery. In addition, country fixed effects and country specific trends also 
account for exploration effort as the factors affecting the likelihood of discovery are either 
time-invariant or time-trending. We control for additional covariates including GDP per 
capita. This is represented by the vector itX . We estimate this model for different leads and 
lags j , where in most cases {2,4,6,8,10}j .  
We are primarily interested in the effect of a new giant discovery itRD  on it jFD  . Our 
coefficient of interest is 1  which presents the marginal effect of resource discovery on fiscal 
decentralization.  
Our main dependent variable is fiscal decentralization it jFD  . Fiscal decentralization 
refers to the degree of fiscal activity ceded by the central government to lower levels of 
government. Fiscal activity comprises of two main components: revenue and expenditure. 
Revenue captures the total cash inflow that pass through a given level of government, and 
expenditure captures the total cash outlay by a given level of government. The two 
components are closely related, with a correlation coefficient of 0.96. Given their importance, 
the existing literature tends to base their measures of fiscal decentralization on revenue and 
expenditure data. On the revenue side, we define the variable Revenue Share as the 
subnational share of total government revenue expressed in percentages. On the expenditure 




















expenditure expressed in percentages. An increase in the share of subnational expenditure or 
revenue indicates a more decentralized fiscal system. Figures 1 and 2 presents a plot of the 
Revenue and Expenditure Share data respectively averaged over the sample period 1970-
2012. 
If the Neo-Hobbesian perspective of Brennan and Buchanan holds then we would 
expect resource discovery to encourage centralization and hence a negative and statistically 
significant 1 . In contrast, in a standard model with benevolent governments one would 
expect that post resource discovery the central government would align fiscal affairs with 
local preferences and hence encourage decentralization. This would imply a positive and 
statistically significant 1 .  
Computing cross-nationally comparable fiscal indicators require data that breaks 
down general government into its different levels. Thus, we rely exclusively on the World 
Bank‟s Database of Fiscal Decentralisation Indicators, which constructs its measures using 
data from the IMF‟s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database. The GFS provides a 
framework that distinguishes between three tiers of government; central, state or provincial, 
and local. This is an essential distinction in the decentralization context with the latter two 
tiers comprising the subnational level. The database is available from the World Bank‟s 
Decentralization and Sub-National Regional Economics Thematic Group, which has 
prepared over a dozen indicators, breaking down revenues and expenditures by type and 
function. This database provides a snapshot of state and local finances in 140 countries over 
the period 1970-2012. 10 
The GFS was originally prepared using the cash method of accounting. However, in 
2001 it was recommended that the GFS should be prepared on an accrual basis in addition to 
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 Note that some discrepancies between the raw data of the GFS and the indicators constructed by the 
World Bank‟s Decentralization and Sub-National Regional Economics Thematic Group were found. Thus, 




















the former method. This is due to the reality that, in practice, many macroeconomic datasets 
including national accounts in many countries is constructed using the accrual method. 
Accrual basis recording is a method in which “the time assigned to flows is when economic 
value is created, transformed, exchanged, transferred, or extinguished” (IMF, 2001). In 
contrast, for cash basis recording, the time assigned to flows is when cash is received or 
disbursed. This means that there are resource flows, for example, accounts payable including 
arrears, which would not be included in a cash accounting system. Our fiscal decentralisation 
indicators use observations with accrual basis reporting where possible, and cash basis in all 
other instances. As mentioned earlier, in equation 1 we also control for a method dummy 
variable it jM  which takes the value 1 if the fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on 
accrual basis and 0 otherwise. 
There are various ways of measuring revenues and expenditures, including as a 
whole, and as a percentage of GDP. Expenditures can be distinguished by their source of 
finance (for example, own-source revenues, subnational tax revenues or intergovernmental 
transfers); and by their sectors (for example, health and education). Furthermore, revenues 
can be broken down by source, for example, general tax and property tax. However, since 
decentralization is a relative concept, the most appropriate and widely used method is to 
measure the subnational proportion of the total government quantity (See for example: 
Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Panizza, 1999; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007). Nevertheless 
we also use the other measures of decentralization as dependent variables in section 3. 
We are well aware of the conceptual issues associated with the decentralization 
measures based on the GFS data. The GFS does not distinguish between delegated and 
devolved functions. Therefore the GFS may incorrectly attribute revenue sources and 
expenditure functions to subnational units even if they hold no discretion to determine 




















expect giant and supergiant resource discovery to be orthogonal to this type of measurement 
error. Therefore it is reasonable to expect the estimate of 1  to be unaffected by measurement 
error of this nature. 
Furthermore, the GFS aggregate the fiscal indicators across all subnational units 
within a single tier, thus it does not capture the horizontal differences across subnational 
governments within tiers. It also does not capture the number of subnational units within a 
country. For example revenue sources, expenditure responsibilities and fiscal autonomy may 
be distributed evenly across the entirety of the subnational jurisdictions, or they may be 
concentrated in one or two. These definitional issues are typically country specific and time 
invariant and hence are captured by the country fixed effects ( )i in equation 1. Giant and 
supergiant resource discoveries are expected to be orthogonal to these definitional issues and 
hence the estimate of 1 should remain unaffected.  
Despite the definitional challenges, the GFS remains the most widely used and 
comprehensive data source on subnational finances, with the widest coverage of countries 
and time periods. It provides the best indicators available without significantly compromising 
data quality. It offers data with consistent definitions across countries and years, thus 
facilitating effective cross-national comparison. 
Our main independent variable of interest is the resource discovery variable. Resource 
discovery is a binary variable taking the value 1 for giant oil or mineral discovery in a 
particular country-year and 0 otherwise. As it may be apparent from the definition above, the 
variable comprises of two components. First, it identifies country-years with the discovery of 
a giant oilfield. As we have mentioned earlier, a giant oil or/and gas (including condensate) 
field typically contains at least a total of 500 million barrels of ultimate recoverable oil or gas 
equivalent. Second, it identifies country-years with the discovery of a giant mine. A giant 




















years or more after accounting for fluctuations in commodity price. As we have discussed 
earlier, it is not possible to accurately predict the timing of a giant discovery. Political 
manipulation of the announcement of discovery dates is also unlikely in our dataset as the 
discovery dates are independently verified and documented using multiple independent 
sources (including industry sources) outside the control of the government.11  
The giant oilfield discovery dates are sourced from Horn (2004) who also reports the 
geographic coordinates of these discoveries. Many recent notable studies of resource curse 
use this data source (see Lei and Michaels, 2014 and Arezki et al., 2014).  The discovery 
dates of giant and major mineral deposits are sourced from MinEx Consulting which reports 
the geographic coordinates of such events over the period 1950 to 2012. Note that we also 
present estimates of oil and mineral discoveries separately in section 3. 
In addition to the agenda of documenting the direct effects of resource discovery on 
fiscal decentralization, we are also interested in how democratization affects the relationship 
between resource discovery and fiscal decentralization. Hence, we estimate the following 
equation.  
1 2 4 53= 10it i it it it it itt i it it itDFD t M RD D RD D Y               X      (2) 
where itD  is the democratization variable in country i  in the year t . We are primarily 
interested in how the quality of political institutions affects the relationship between new 
giant resource discovery itRD  and itFD . Hence our coefficients of interest here are 2 and 
4 as the marginal effect of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization in this specification 
is 2 4 itD  given the level of democratization. 
We follow Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Bhattacharyya (2013), and Bhattacharyya 
and Hodler (2015) and code the democratization itD  variable as a treatment variable. The 
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democracy measure used to code the itD  treatment is the Polity2 score from the Polity IV 
database, which is described by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). This database reports 
democracy and autocracy scores, which both vary between 0 and 10 with 10 being the most 
democratic or most autocratic, respectively. The democracy score measures competition and 
openness in the electoral process, and the autocracy score measures suppression of 
competitiveness over executive recruitment, lack of constraints on the executive, and 
regulation of participation. The Polity2 score is the difference between democracy and 
autocracy scores which runs between -10 and +10. Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) 
and Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2015) we define democratization 1itD   in a country if its 
POLITY2 score turns from negative to positive. One could argue that a positive POLITY2 
score is too low a threshold for democratization as most permanent democratic transitions 
occur at higher scores. To account for the potential influence of a 0 threshold, we also test the 
robustness of our result with a democratization threshold of POLITY2 = 5 and find that the 
results are qualitatively unaffected.12 
We consider three types of democratization: First, we consider democratization 
episodes that are not subsequently reversed. They are denoted by the treatment 
Democratization (permament) in the result tables13. Second, we consider both temporary and 
permanent democratization episodes that last at least four years, as we expect that it takes 
time for democratic change to influence fiscal decentralization. They are denoted by the 
treatment Democratization (all) in the result tables. In situations where the democratic change 
last less than four years, we ignore such change and code it as if it did not occur. 
Furthermore, following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) we also discard democratic change that 
took place in the last three years of the sample. The Democratization variable in such 
situations is set to be missing. Third, we consider permanent democratization episodes that 
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 Not reported here but are available upon request. 
13




















took place before resource discovery. 
One could argue that the actual revenue stream from natural resources is more 
important for fiscal decentralization than the resource discovery induced news shock. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile examining the effect of resource rent on decentralization. Hence 
we replace the resource discovery variable in equations (1) and (2) by resource rent and re-
estimate the models.  
The data on natural resource rents is obtained from the World Bank‟s Changing 
Wealth of Nations Dataset. The dataset covers 214 countries over the period 1970 to 2012. 
The rent obtained from a particular commodity is calculated as its world price minus the 
average extraction or harvesting cost, with both components measured in current US dollars. 
The unit rents are then multiplied by the physical quantities harvested or extracted by the 
country to give the total rents for the commodity. To construct total resource rents, we 
aggregate the rents of individual commodities for a country and a particular year, assuming 
zero values for missing data points on individual commodities. We then divide the resource 
rents by GDP (in current US dollars) and express them as a share. This is in line with several 
prominent empirical papers (see, Mehlum et al., 2006; and Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). 
The variable captures the relative importance of resources in the domestic economy. 
Normalizing the resource rent variable by GDP could introduce reverse causality 
challenges. Therefore, we instrument the resource rent variable by international commodity 
price. The international commodity price variable is sourced from a dataset by Burke and 
Leigh (2010). The authors construct an index for a commodity export bundle of 50 
commodities - 35 of which are agricultural commodities and 15 non-agricultural 
commodities. To create the index, the authors obtain annual world commodity prices from 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF, and deflate these prices using 




















create an annual price index. These indices are arithmetically weighted using the 1995 
commodity export shares to construct the country-specific commodity export price index.  
Other variables used in the study are: oil and mineral rents and GDP per capita. The 
supplementary appendix reports summary statistics on the key variables and Appendix A3 
presents detailed definition of variables.14   
3 Evidence 
3.1 Do Economic and Political Factors Predict Resource Discovery? 
How random is the timing of resource discovery? To what extent economic and political 
factors influence the timing of giant resource discoveries? We test the predictive power of 
economic and political factors when it comes to the timing of resource discoveries. In 
particular, using a logit fixed effects model which also controls for year dummies and country 
specific linear trend we find that wildcat drilling, growth in GDP per capita lagged, 
international commodity price lagged, investment as a share of GDP lagged, government 
expenditure as a share of GDP lagged, and Polity 2 lagged have very little predictive power 
over the timing of giant resource discoveries. We find past discoveries positively predicts 
giant resource discoveries. This is consistent with Lei and Michaels (2014). These results are 
suggestive that the timing of giant and supergiant resource discoveries are largely orthogonal 
and on average are not affected by the underlying economic and political factors in the 
country.  
3.2 Natural Resource Discovery and Fiscal Decentralization  
Natural resource discovery could lead to fiscal decentralization under preference 
heterogeneity if both the central and provincial governments are utility maximizing 
benevolent actors acting on behalf of their citizens. Alternatively, it could also encourage 
                                                 
14We also check for stationarity of the fiscal decentralization and resource rent variables using the 
Levin–Lin–Chu and the Harris–Tzavalis variety of unit root tests. Both tests account for bias emanating from 




















centralization if the central government is revenue hungry and unconstrained. Therefore, the 
conflicting theoretical claims outlined above makes an open empirical question.  
In table 1 we take the conflicting theories to the data and test our canonical empirical 
model outlined in equation 1 when 0j   (ie., contemporaneous specification). Columns 1 – 
3 use revenue share as the dependent variable which measures the subnational contribution to 
total government revenue. Higher subnational share of government revenue would imply 
more revenue decentralization. In a sample of 72 countries covering the period 1970 to 2012 
we do not find any evidence of revenue centralization or decentralization. This no effect 
result is uniform across the type of resources – oil and minerals. However, the story is 
somewhat different when it comes to expenditure. Columns 4 – 6 examine the average effect 
of resource discovery on the subnational share of government expenditure. We find that 
resource discovery on average reduces the subnational share of expenditure by 1.93 percent. 
For example, the actual difference in the degree of expenditure decentralization between 
Japan and Germany over the period 1970 to 2012 is about (41.53 - 38.81) = 2.72 percent. 
Therefore, to put this into perspective our model predicts if Japan discovers a giant or 
supergiant resource deposit then her subnational share of expenditure would decline and 
would be 71 percent close to the level of Germany. In columns 5 and 6 we test the effects of 
oil and mineral discovery and find that the centralization effect is driven by oil and not 
minerals. 
Discovery precedes production and there is a significant lag between the two. 
Therefore, there is no new flow of revenue immediately after a discovery. This perhaps 
explains why the central government is not in a hurry to change revenue raising rules and 
hence the non-effect on revenue shares. In contrast, resource discovery promptly affects 
expectations and by association spending decisions of subnational governments. The 




















governments promptly increase control over expenditure to prevent sub-national government 
overspend.   
Discovery news shock is also likely to have a lasting effect. Hence, we look at the 
intertemporal effect of news shock in figure 3. The left hand panel presents intertemporal 
effects of resource discovery on the revenue share whereas the right hand panel focuses on 
the expenditure share. We trace any potential effect 10 years pre and post discovery. We find 
that the resource discovery news shock do now have any contemporaneous or lasting effect 
on the subnational share of revenue. However, we observe up to six years of statistically 
significant concentration in the subnational share of expenditure post discovery. This is 
suggestive that the spending decisions of the central government are more sensitive towards 
discovery news shocks than the revenue collection decisions. As stated above, a plausible 
explanation could be that the central government prefers to be in control of overall spending 
post discovery news shock to prevent subnational government overspend.  
The lack of revenue centralization post 1970 could be due to oil rich countries having 
significant amount of discoveries in the 1960s or earlier. As a result they could already be 
highly revenue centralized before the start of our sample period. We do not have data on 
fiscal decentralization before 1970 to credibly comment on the degree of decentralization. 
However, we do have data on giant oil discovery dating back to 1962. Our data indicates that 
a large number of discoveries took place in the 1970s and late 1990s are also significant. 
Therefore, there is significant variation in our discovery data to track the marginal effect of 
discovery on fiscal decentralization.  
3.3 The Political Economy of Natural Resource Discovery and Fiscal Decentralization                
As we have indicated earlier, the relationship between natural resources and fiscal 
decentralization could be influenced by the quality and nature of political institutions. In 




















political constrains can prevent it from revenue grabbing. To test this theory in table 2 we 
introduce the interaction term between resource discovery and democratization variables. We 
follow Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and consider two types of democratization episodes 
based on the Polity2 measure. The first definition includes permanent democratization 
episodes (positive Polity2 score) only whereby the countries do not switch back to autocracy 
(negative or zero Polity2 score). Most post-Soviet Eastern European countries would fit this 
definition. The second definition includes both permanent and temporary democratization 
episodes. Temporary democratization is defined as countries switching to a positive Polity2 
score for at least 4 years and then switching back to a negative score. Many developing 
countries in Latin America and Africa would fit this characterization. Using both forms of 
democratization treatment is perhaps useful to show that the interaction result is not sensitive 
to coding. 
In column 1 we find that resource discovery reduces the subnational share of revenue 
by 5.7 percent but this concentration effect is reversed by permanent democratization. The 
net effect of the discovery news shock for countries that permanently democratized is 6.86 – 
5.70 = 1.16 percent. In other words, permanently democratized countries respond to 
discovery news shock by decentralizing revenue collection. This pattern stays firm in column 
2 when we replace the democratization (permanent) variable with democratization (all) albeit 
with a smaller magnitude of decentralization for the democratized countries. In column 3 we 
replace the democratization (all) measure with democratization (permanent) before resource 
discovery. This democratization variable codes permanent democratic transitions as 1 only if 
they occurred before the first resource discovery. This is to account for the possibility that 
democracy could be endogenous to oil discovery (Tsui, 2011). We observe similar pattern in 




















the dependent variable. We observe similar pattern in the data.15  
One interpretation of the result is that resource discoveries trigger cash flow 
changes at the different levels of government and not fiscal decentralization. 
Countries with pre-existing decentralized fiscal framework are likely to levy tax on 
natural resources at the sub-national level. Therefore, a resource boom would appear 
like decentralization in our subnational fiscal share indicator even though no actual 
fiscal decentralization took place. This is unlikely to be the case here as discoveries are 
news shocks and do not trigger an immediate increase in cash flow. Furthermore, it is 
not entirely certain that resource rich countries would tax resource revenue at the sub-
national level. Nevertheless, controlling for total government expenditure and taxation 
levels along with GDP levels would reduce the effects of a changing denominator of a 
sub-national fiscal share. We do that by explicitly controlling for total tax revenue, total 
government expenditure, and GDP levels and the coefficients of interest remain statistically 
significant exhibiting the same sign. These results are reported in the supplementary 
appendix. 
Is this result driven by debt overhang as central government can borrow post 
discovery? Given that debt often follows a country specific trend, it is highly likely that our 
specification already controls for debt overhang. Nevertheless, we also explicitly control for 
debt overhang by replacing the country specific trend with log debt to GDP ratio and the 
results are unaffected.  
In table 3 we go beyond the contemporaneous estimates reported in table 2 and test 
the timing of the effect of discovery news shock and the democratization shock on fiscal 
decentralization. The timing here is an important indicator of the agility of the legislative 
                                                 
15
 We also present split sample estimates in the supplementary appendix. The results line up with the 
interaction estimates. Furthermore, we present estimates of interactions with presidential political systems, 
onshore resource discovery, and early industrializer dummy. None of these variables have any effect on the 




















system post discovery news and democratization shocks. In other words, how rapidly the 
fiscal decentralization related legislative arrangements between central and regional 
governments change. We find that the statistical effect on fiscal decentralization endures 6 
years after the shocks beyond which it turns statistically insignificant. This could imply that 
on average the fiscal arrangements change within 6 years of a discovery news shock. 
However, it could also be the result of a post-discovery cash flow effect. Such cash flow 
effect depend on the twin assumptions of giant discoveries entering production very quickly 
and the country in question taxes resource revenue at the sub-national level. Even though 
plausible, the latter seems to be unlikely as most resource rich (and especially oil rich) 
nations tax resource revenue at the national level. Nevertheless, we are unable to rule out a 
cash flow effect post discovery.  
In table 4 we test whether the political economy effect is conditional on the type of 
natural resources. Our data allows us to distinguish between oil or/and gas and mineral 
discoveries. We find that the pattern is especially strong with oil and gas. Perhaps this is 
suggestive of the fact that petroleum resources are „point source‟ and therefore much more 
decoupled from the rest of the economy. Hence, the news of oil bounty affects potential 
export revenue and the coffers of the central government more than provincial governments. 
Thus the central government exerts more control over oil driven potential revenue and 
expenditure. In contrast, minerals tend to be „diffuse‟ and therefore much more linked to the 
rest of the economy and encourage both forward and backward linkages. Therefore, revenue 
and expenditure decisions in a mineral rich country could be much more evenly spread. 
An alternative explanation could be that oil revenue is much more easily appropriable 
by central governments. Oil contracts often take the form of direct negotiations between the 
central government and large corporations. Furthermore, oil involves less backward and 




















impact on the revenue expectations of the regional government relative to that of the central 
government. In contrast, mineral revenues are not as readily appropriable as oil and therefore 
the revenue consequences for the central and regional governments are lot less skewed.  
To summarize, the pattern in the data is suggestive that resource discovery encourages 
centralization but additional democratic control on the central government could potentially 
reverse this pattern. This broadly fits with the theoretical paradigm that central governments 
prefer revenue centralization post resource discovery. However, their ability to do so is 
constrained by the nature of political institutions. Political competition in general and 
democratic institutions in particular restricts the ability of the central government to 
unilaterally impose taxes which gives rise to a more decentralized fiscal arrangement post 
resource discovery.   
This leads us to the question of mechanism. We test whether resource discoveries lead 
to more military spending in non-democracies and thereby encouraging fiscal centralization. 
We do not find evidence in support of this thesis. A reasonable explanation could be that 
resource discoveries influence the power relation between central and regional governments. 
Under non-democratic political institutions these relationships are likely to be skewed in 
favor of the center. Resource discovery aids and abets that centralization process. This 
however is not that evident under democratic political institutions where the power relation 
between governments are likely to be less skewed.        
3.4 Which Fiscal Variables are affected by Resource Discovery and Democratization? 
Not all fiscal variables are directly linked to natural resources, thus they are unlikely to be 
affected by resource discovery. In table 5 we test whether there is any asymmetric effect of 
resource discovery on fiscal variables. In column 1 we specifically focus on tax revenue 
which is a subset of total government revenue. We use the subnational share of tax revenue as 




















reduces subnational tax share by approximately 7.7 percent however this centralization effect 
is reversed in permanently democratized countries.  
Transfers from the central government are a major source of revenue for the 
subnational governments. In column 2 we use intergovernmental transfers as a share of total 
subnational government‟s revenue. A high share of intergovernmental transfer would imply 
more decentralization as the central government is transferring more resources to the 
subnational government. We find that there is a significant asymmetry in the relationship 
between resource discovery and intergovernmental transfer share across the type of political 
institutions. Permanently democratized countries are more likely to transfer resources to the 
subnational governments post resource discovery with the share of intergovernmental 
transfers increasing on average by 2.2 percent. In contrast, on average the post discovery 
share declines in non-democracies by 2.9 percent.  
In columns 3 and 4 we also examine the effects of resource discovery on the 
subnational governments own source revenue (as a share of total subnational expenditure) 
and subnational tax revenue (as a share of total subnational expenditure) respectively. A 
higher share of own source revenue or subnational tax revenue would signify more fiscal 
autonomy of the subnational government. We find similar asymmetric pattern in the data 
across permanently democratized countries and all others. However, the effect is statistically 
weak and only marginally significant in case of own source revenue. 
In columns 5 – 7 we search for any potential heterogeneity across different types of 
taxes and expenditures. We have data on property tax, education expenditure, and health 
expenditure. Column 5 reports on the subnational share of total government property tax. One 
could reasonably expect a property or construction boom at the back of a giant resource 
discovery. Politicians could also engage in building more schools and hospitals expecting a 




















subnational shares of total government education and health expenditures in columns 6 and 7 
respectively. We do not find any statistically significant effect even though a similar pattern 
in the data is demonstrated by the signs of the coefficients. 
In summary, we find strong evidence of resource discovery news shock on 
subnational tax share and intergovernmental transfers. The effect is asymmetric as we find 
that faced with a resource discovery shock permanently democratized countries tolerate more 
fiscal autonomy than all other countries. We find weak or very little evidence of resource 
discovery and democratization affecting subnational governments own source revenue. 
Popular expectations command that resource discovery would trigger property boom and 
increased health and education spending. If this is indeed the case then we would observe 
resource discovery having an effect on property tax, education expenditure and health 
expenditure. We do not observe such patterns in the data.16           
3.5 Resource Rent, Democratization and Fiscal Decentralization?  
So much for resource discovery. How about the effect of resource rent on fiscal 
decentralization? In table 6 we test the effect of resource rent and democratization on fiscal 
decentralization. 
Resource rent is measured as a percentage share of GDP. In columns 1 – 5 of table 6 
we look at the relationship between resource rent and the subnational share of total 
government revenue. Column 1 presents a linear fixed effects model and finds a statistically 
significant negative coefficient. As we have discussed earlier, the resource rent variable is 
potentially endogenous, thus in column 2 we use international commodity price as an 
instrument and estimate the model using the instrumental variable (IV) method. Following 
Burke and Leigh (2010) we argue that the effect of commodity prices on tax and spending 
shares in a resource-driven economy should work via resource rent. Therefore it is unlikely 
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 The non-result in columns 3-7 of table 4 could be driven by sample attrition. Note that the sample 




















that the commodity price instrument violates the exclusion restriction.17 We find strong 
evidence of centralization. A 1 percentage point increase in resource rent decreases the 
subnational share of total government revenue by 0.9 percent. In column 3 we introduce the 
interaction term between resource rent and permanent democratization. We observe 
asymmetry in the relationship across permanently democratized countries and all others. For 
instance, higher resource rent still triggers centralization in permanently democratized 
countries albeit at a diminished magnitude of 0.7 percent. The centralization effect is much 
bigger for non-democratic countries averaging at 1.1 percent. In column 4 we use a somewhat 
flexible definition of democratization by including temporary democratization episodes in the 
dataset. The interaction term stays positive but is no longer statistically significant. In column 
5 we replace the democratization measures by raw Polity 2 score. The same nonlinear pattern 
in the data remains. The threshold Polity 2 score for a zero or decentralization effect is 9. 
Columns 6 – 10 repeat the same tests with subnational share of total government expenditure 
as the dependent variable. The pattern observed in the data in columns 1 – 5 largely holds. 
Table 7 tests whether the effect is uniform across oil and mineral rents and finds that 
the effect is largely uniform. However, the effect is statistically stronger in case of oil rent. 
Therefore, in summary the results observed with resource discovery as the key independent 
variable in tables 1 -4 is confirmed by using resource rent as the key independent variable in 
tables 5 – 6.  
Through what mechanism resource rents affect fiscal decentralization? Rents could 
affect fiscal decentralization through both a routine cash flow as well as a genuine fiscal 
regime shift. A routine cash flow effect signifies an increase in the subnational share of 
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 Furthermore, we also use the Conley et al. (2012) approach of plausible exogeneity. Even after 
considering [0,1.5]  we find the coefficient on „resource rent as a share of GDP‟ to be [-1.13, 0.10]. This is 
different from the [-0.51, 0.10] interval under perfect instrument ( 0  ). However, under both priors on  the 
coefficient stays negative in majority of cases leading us to conclude that the negative and significant effect of 




















revenue following a resources boom if taxes on natural resources are levied at the local level. 
A regime shift in contrast would be a genuine change in the fiscal arrangements between the 
central and the subnational governments. Given that we are controlling for GDP per capita 
and country specific trend, our estimates in table 8 are more likely to be reflective of a fiscal 
regime shift. Furthermore, a fiscal regime shift is entirely plausible following permanent 
democratization and resource rent increase. This is confirmed by our estimates in table 8 
where we notice that the effect of resource rent and democratization remain statistically 
significant up to two years after the shock. However, we are unable to rule out a routine cash 
flow effect from the increased rent following a resource boom.       
4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper is motivated by several case studies that have drawn attention to the potential 
interplay between natural resources, political institutions and intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. It is also motivated by conflicting theoretical predictions. First, that resource 
discovery could embolden a central government who is acting as a revenue maximizing 
Leviathan to act far more unilaterally and centralize fiscal affairs. Second, resource discovery 
could also allow the central government to decentralize in order to either expand political 
patronage to stay in power or to improve the efficiency of public spending by addressing the 
preference matching problem. The objective of this paper is to offer an analysis of this topic 
by systematically analysing the effect of natural resources and political institutions on fiscal 
decentralization. The paper is also an attempt to address the causality challenge by using the 
exogenous news shock of giant oil and minerals discovery and the IV method as identifiers of 
the effects of natural resources on decentralization.  
Estimating a model controlling for country fixed effects, year dummies, past 
discoveries, GDP per capita, and fiscal decentralization measurement definitions we find that 




















total government revenue. However, it reduces the subnational share of total government 
expenditure. Giant oil discovery appears to be driving this direct effect. There is very little 
evidence of intertemporal effect of resource discovery on revenue decentralization both 10 
years pre-and-post discovery. However we find evidence of expenditure centralization up to 6 
years post discovery. We also document asymmetry in the relationship. In other words, 
permanent democratization and the quality of political institutions exert a differential impact 
on the effect of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization. Permanently democratized 
countries seem to tolerate more subnational fiscal autonomy faced with a resource discovery 
news shock whereas for all other countries the trend is overwhelmingly in favour of 
centralization.  This effect is predominantly driven by oil even though not limited to it. These 
effects are robust after controlling for wildcat drilling as a measure of exploration intensity. 
Not all fiscal institutions respond identically to a resource discovery news shock. We 
find that tax and intergovernmental transfers respond most to the shocks of resource 
discovery and democratization. However, contrary to common expectations we do not find 
any evidence of discovery induced property boom or welfare spending (central government 
funded schools and hospitals) boom. The effect is largely similar when we switch to resource 
rent as the key explanatory variable and estimate the model using international commodity 
price as an IV.  
The paper provides an insight into the intergovernmental fiscal relations in resource 
rich countries. Resource rich countries with more representative political institutions are far 
more likely to tolerate some degree of fiscal autonomy of the subnational governments. 
Resource rich countries with more centralized political institutions overwhelmingly prefer 
more centralized fiscal institutions. Whether a more decentralized fiscal model would 





















There is a large literature on the merits of fiscal decentralization. Even though related, 
we refrain from commenting on the merits of decentralization in resource rich countries here. 
That is another question for another day. 
Appendices 
 
A1. List of Countries in the Sample: 
Following countries are included in our specification of column 4, table 1. 
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Korea, Rep., Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, United States, Zimbabwe. 
A2. Countries and Years of Permanent Democratization: 
Always democratic or always non-democratic countries: 
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, emocratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa 
Rica, Cote d‟Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Zimbabwe. 
Permanently democratic change events included in the sample (36): 
Albania (1997), Argentina (1983), Armenia (1998), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), Bulgaria (1990), 
Chile (1989), Croatia (1999), Czech Republic (1990), El Salvador (1982), Estonia (1991), Ethiopia 
(1993), Georgia (1991), Hungary (1989), Indonesia (1999), Iran (1997), Republic of Korea (1987), 
Latvia (1991),  Lithuania (1991), Mexico (1994), Moldova (1991), Mongolia (1990), Nicaragua 




















Federation (1992), Serbia and Montenegro (2000), Slovak Republic (1990), Slovenia (1991), Thailand 
(1992), Turkey (1983), Ukraine (1991).   
A3. Number of Years with One or More Giant Oil Discoveries by Country: 
Sample Period 1970-2003: 
Saudi Arabia (18), Iran (16), Norway (14), Indonesia (13), Australia (12), China (12), Brazil (11), Iraq 
(11), Nigeria (11), United States (11), United Kingdom (10),  Mexico (9), Canada (6), Egypt (6), 
Malaysia (6), United Arab Emirates (6), Venezuela (6), Angola (5), Libya (5), Oman (5), Argentina 
(4), Colombia (4), India (4), Congo Rep. (3), Peru (3), Thailand (3), Algeria (2), Bolivia (2), Italy (2), 
Kazakhstan (2), Kuwait (2), Myanmar (2), Pakistan (2), Qatar (2), Sudan (2), Trinidad and Tobago 
(2), Tunisia (2), Yemen (2), Azerbaijan (1), Bangladesh (1), Brunei (1), Cote d‟Ivorie (1), Denmark 
(1), Equatorial Guinea (1), Morocco (1), Netherlands (1), Papua New Guinea (1), Philippines (1), 
Romania (1), Russian Federation (1), Turkmenistan (1). 
A4. Data Appendix: 
Subnational Revenue Share: It is the percentage of total revenues accounted for by sub-national 
governments, measured as the sum of local and state total revenues, excluding grants from state to 
local government, divided by the sum of local, provincial and national revenues. Source: Database of 
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank. 
Subnational Expenditure Share: It is the percentage of total expenditures accounted for by sub-
national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial total expenditures, excluding 
grants from state to local government, divided by the sum of local, provincial and national 
expenditures, excluding intergovernmental transfers. Source: Database of Fiscal Decentralization 
Indicators, The World Bank. 
Subnational Share of Health Expenditure: It is the percentage of total health expenditures 
accounted for by sub-national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial health 
expenditures, divided by the sum of local, provincial and national health expenditures. Source: 
Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank. 
Subnational Share of Education Expenditure: It is the percentage of total education expenditures 
accounted for by sub-national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial education 
expenditures, divided by the sum of local, provincial and national education expenditures. Source: 
Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank. 
Subnational Share of Tax Revenue: It is the percentage of total tax revenues collected by sub-
national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial tax revenues, divided by the sum 
of local, provincial and national tax revenues. Source: Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, 




















Subnational Share of Property Tax Revenue: It is the percentage of total property tax revenues 
collected by sub-national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial tax revenues, 
divided by the sum of local, provincial and national property tax revenues. Source: Database of Fiscal 
Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank. 
Intergovernmental Transfers: It is the percentage of total subnational revenues and grants that is 
formed by transfers from other levels of government, measured as the sum of transfers received by 
local and provincial governments, divided by the sum of local and provincial revenues. Source: 
Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank. 
Subnational Own Source Revenue: It is the percentage of expenditures financed with subnational 
governments‟ own source revenue, measured as the sum of local and state own source revenues minus 
grants received from grants or transfers from other levels of government, relative to total subnational 
expenditures. Source: Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank. 
Natural resource discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of 
natural resources (giant oil/ mineral discoveries) in a country-year. Source: Horn (2004) and MinEx 
Consulting. 
Oil discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of a giant oil reserve 
in a country-year. See section 1 and table footnotes for the definition of giant oil reserve. Source: 
Horn (2004). 
Mineral discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of a giant 
mineral reserve in a country-year. See section 1 and table footnotes for the definition of giant mineral 
reserve and footnote 4 for a list of minerals included in the dataset. Source: MinEx Consulting. 
Resource Rents: Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents 
(hard and soft) rents, mineral rents, and forest rents. Minerals consist of: bauxite, copper, lead, nickel, 
phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver, and iron ore. Rents are measured as a percentage share of GDP. 
Source: The World Bank. 
Polity2: Democracy score measured by Polity2. Source: Polity IV dataset. 
Democratization (permanent / all): Democratization=1 after democratization (i.e., Polity2 score 
turning positive). We consider two types of democratization: Treatments that are not subsequently 
reversed are denoted by “permanent” and treatments that last at least four years are denoted by “all”. 
Source: Calculation based on Polity IV dataset. 
Method Dummy: Method dummy = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis, 
and 0 if reported on cash basis. 
GDP per capita: GDP per capita measured in PPP constant 2005 US dollars. , divided by total 
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Figure 1. Distribution of the Share of Subnational Revenue to Total Government Revenue  
 























Figure 2. Distribution of the Share of Subnational Expenditure to Total Government Expenditure  
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Figure 3: The Intertemporal Effects of Resource Discovery
on Fiscal Decentralization
 
Notes: The graphs show the timing of the Resource Discovery treatment effects on two different 
measures of fiscal decentralization. The resource discovery year here is t j when 0j  . The 
dependent variables (Revenue Share and Expenditure Share) are regressed on a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for j years before resource discovery where { 10, 8, 6, 4, 2,0,2,4,6,8,10}j      . 
The number of years with resource discoveries in the last ten years ( 10itYD ) is used as a control in all 
specifications. The dots show the point estimates, and the bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Standard errors in the regressions are clustered and robust. All regressions include country fixed 











































RESOURCE DISCOVERY AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 Revenue Share Revenue Share Revenue Share Expenditure Share Expenditure Share Expenditure 
Share 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





  -1.93*** 
(0.70) 
  
       
Oil Discovery  -2.14   -2.30***  
  (1.31)   (0.90)  
Minerals 
Discovery 
  0.27 
(0.73) 
  -0.80 
(0.75) 
       
Controls Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Country Specific Trends, Method Dummy, Number of Discovery Years in the Last 10 Years, GDP per capita 
 
       
Observations 1118 1118 1118 1080 1080 1080 
Countries 72 72 72 77 77 77 
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard error. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, arbitrary 
intra-group correlation and cross-sectional dependence. All regressions control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country specific linear trends, 
method dummy and GDP per capita. The method dummy variable assumes the value 1 if the observation for fiscal decentralization indicator for that 
country year is reported on accrual basis, and 0 if reported on cash basis. Revenue Share: subnational share of total government revenues (%). Expenditure 
Share: subnational share of total government expenditures (%). Resource Discovery, Oil Discovery and Mineral Discovery are dummy variables taking the 
value 1 for the discovery years and 0 otherwise. The discoveries here are giant discoveries only.  Note that to qualify as a giant oilfield, it must contain 
ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of at least 500 million barrels of oil equivalent. This data is from Horn (2004). To qualify as a giant mineral deposit, it 
must have the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20 years or more accounting for fluctuations in commodity price. This data 
is from Minex Consultancies. ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. The Data Appendix 






















RESOURCE DISCOVERY, DEMOCRATIZATION AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 Revenue Share Revenue Share Revenue Share Expenditure Share Expenditure Share Expenditure Share 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




















  8.85** 
(4.25) 
  





  7.61** 
(3.74) 
 
       
Democratization  
(permanent) before 
RD × RD 
  5.81** 
(2.56) 
  7.70** 
(3.80) 
Controls Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Country Specific Trends, Method Dummy, Number of Discovery Years in the Last 10 Years, GDP per capita, Democracy Variables 
       
Observations 1056 1056 1056 1061 1061 1061 
Countries 69 69 69 74 74 74 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.39 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, arbitrary intra-
group correlation and cross-sectional dependence. All regressions control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country specific linear trends, method 
dummy and GDP per capita. The method dummy variable = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis, and 0 if reported on cash basis. 
Revenue Share: subnational share of total government revenues (%). Expenditure Share: subnational share of total government expenditures (%). Resource 
Discovery is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the discovery years and 0 otherwise. The discoveries here are giant discoveries only.  Note that to qualify 
as a giant oilfield, it must contain ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of at least 500 million barrels of oil equivalent. This data is from Horn (2004). To 
qualify as a giant mineral deposit, it must have the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20 years or more accounting for 






































VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






































Controls Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Country Specific Trends, Method Dummy, Number of Discovery Years in the Last 10 Years, GDP per capita, Democratization (permanent) 
         
Observations 1043 1017 985 967 1005 982 950 931 
Countries 69 69 69 69 74 74 74 74 
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.38 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, arbitrary intra-
group correlation and cross-sectional dependence. All regressions control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country specific linear trends, method 
dummy and GDP per capita. The method dummy variable = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis, and 0 if reported on cash basis. 
Revenue Share: subnational share of total government revenues (%). Expenditure Share: subnational share of total government expenditures (%). Resource 
Discovery is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the discovery years and 0 otherwise. The discoveries here are giant discoveries only.  Note that to qualify 
as a giant oilfield, it must contain ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of at least 500 million barrels of oil equivalent. This data is from Horn (2004). To 
qualify as a giant mineral deposit, it must have the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20 years or more accounting for 
fluctuations in commodity price. This data is from Minex Consultancies. Democratization=1 after democratization (i.e., Polity2 score turning positive). We 
consider one type of democratization: Treatments that are not subsequently reversed are denoted by ǲpermanentǳ. ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 




























OIL & MINERAL DISCOVERY AND THE POLITICS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 Revenue Share Revenue Share Expenditure Share Expenditure Share 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Oil Discovery (OD) -6.98**  -11.47***  
 (3.86)  (1.75)  






















Controls Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Country Specific Trends, Method Dummy, Number of Discovery Years in the Last 10 Years, GDP per capita, Democratization (permanent) 
     
Observations 1056 1056 1016 1016 
Countries 69 69 74 74 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.37 0.40 0.37 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, arbitrary intra-
group correlation and cross-sectional dependence. All regressions control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country specific linear trends, method 
dummy and GDP per capita. The method dummy variable = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis, and 0 if reported on cash basis. 
Revenue Share: subnational share of total government revenues (%). Expenditure Share: subnational share of total government expenditures (%). Oil 
Discovery and Mineral Discovery are dummy variables taking the value 1 for the discovery years and 0 otherwise. The discoveries here are giant discoveries 
only.  Note that to qualify as a giant oilfield, it must contain ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of at least 500 million barrels of oil equivalent. This data is 
from Horn (2004). To qualify as a giant mineral deposit, it must have the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20 years or more 
accounting for fluctuations in commodity price. This data is from Minex Consultancies. Democratization=1 after democratization (i.e., Polity2 score turning positiveȌ. We consider ǲpermanentǳ democratization here whereby the treatments are not subsequently reversed. ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 






















WHICH FISCAL VARIABLES ARE AFFECTED BY RESOURCE DISCOVERY AND DEMOCRATIZATION?  
 TaxShare TraShare ExpOwn ExpTax PTax Eexp HeExp 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Resource Discovery (RD) -7.67*** -2.91** -4.04 -1.43 -4.09 -2.36 -4.70 

















        
Controls 
Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Country Specific Trends, 
Method Dummy, Number of Discovery Years in the Last 10 Years, GDP per 
capita, Democratization (permanent) 
        
Observations 1118 1646 863 981 725 474 435 
Countries 69 91 72 76 58 48 48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.408 0.59 0.55 0.60 0.49 0.53 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, arbitrary intra-
group correlation and cross-sectional dependence. All regressions control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country specific linear trends, method 
dummy, democratization, and GDP per capita. The method dummy variable = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis, and 0 if 
reported on cash basis. Resource Discovery is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the discovery years and 0 otherwise. The discoveries here are giant 
discoveries only.  Note that to qualify as a giant oilfield, it must contain ultimate recoverable reserves (URR) of at least 500 million barrels of oil equivalent. 
This data is from Horn (2004). To qualify as a giant mineral deposit, it must have the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20 
years or more accounting for fluctuations in commodity price. This data is from Minex Consultancies. Democratization=1 after democratization (i.e., Polity2 score turning positiveȌ. We consider ǲpermanentǳ democratization here whereby the treatments are not subsequently reversed. The dependent variables are 
defined as follows: TaxShare: subnational share of total government tax revenue. TraShare: intergovernmental transfers as a share of total subnational 
government revenue. ExpOwn: subnational government own source revenue as a share of total subnational expenditures. ExpTax: subnational tax revenue as 
a share of total subnational expenditures. Ptax: Subnational share of total government property tax. Eexp: subnational share of total government education 
expenditures. HeExp: subnational share of total government health expenditures. ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
























RESOURCE RENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 
SUBNATIONAL SHARE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES 
(%) 
SUBNATIONAL SHARE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES (%) 
 OLS  IV OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Resource Rent (RR) -1.06*** -0.91*** -1.14*** -0.89*** -0.90*** -1.15*** -0.78*** -1.24*** -0.96*** -0.96*** 
 (0.29) (0.22) (0.32) (0.26) (0.23) (0.30) (0.20) (0.33) (0.30) (0.28) 
Democratization  
(permanent)×RR 
  0.38** 
(0.19) 
    0.44* 
(0.24) 
  
           
Democratization  
(all)×RR 
   0.44 
(0.45) 
    0.35 
(0.41) 
 
           
Polity2 × RR     0.10*** 
(0.28) 
    0.10*** 
(0.02) 
Controls Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Country Specific Trends, Method Dummy, GDP per capita, Democracy Variables 
Instrumental Variable 
(IV) 
 Int. comm. 
price 
    Int. comm. 
price 
   
F-Stat IV Relevance  55.5     56.6    
Underidentification  3.96     3.79    
Observations 1112 1112 1050 1050 1050 1073 1073 1009 1009 1009 
Countries 72 72 69 69 69 77 77 74 74 74 
Adjusted R2 0.49  0.50 0.52 0.54 0.51  0.53 0.54 0.55 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, arbitrary intra-group 
correlation and cross-sectional dependence. All regressions control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country specific linear trends, method dummy, 
democratization, and GDP per capita. The method dummy variable = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis, and 0 if reported on cash basis. 
Resource Rent is defined as the total resource rents to GDP. Democratization=1 after democratization (i.e., Polity2 score turning positive). We consider two types of 
democratization: Treatments that are not subsequently reversed are denoted by “permanent”, and treatments that last at least four years are denoted by “all”. All regressions 
include an intercept. F-Stat IV Relevance provides the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic on the excluded instrument from the first-stage regression. The statistic must 
exceed 10 for the instrument to be of sufficient strength. Underidentification provides the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic for underidentification. The statistic must exceed 
























OIL AND MINERAL RENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
 Revenue Share Revenue Share Expenditure Share Expenditure Share 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Oil Rent (OR) -1.20***  -1.31***  
 (3.86)  (0.07)  






















Controls Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Country Specific Trends, Method Dummy, GDP per capita, Democratization (permanent) 
     
Observations 1050 1050 1009 1009 
Countries 69 69 74 74 
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.37 0.53 0.37 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, arbitrary intra-
group correlation and cross-sectional dependence. All regressions control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country specific linear trends, method 
dummy and GDP per capita. The method dummy variable = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis, and 0 if reported on cash 
basis. Revenue Share: subnational share of total government revenues (%). Expenditure Share: subnational share of total government expenditures 
(%). Oil Rent is defined as the total oil and gas rents to GDP. Mineral Rent is defined as the mineral rent to GDP. Democratization=1 after democratization ȋi.e., Polity2 score turning positiveȌ. We consider ǲpermanentǳ democratization here whereby the treatments are not subsequently reversed. ***, **, 























RESOURCE RENT, DEMOCRATIZATION AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: TIMING OF RESPONSE 
 Revenue Share [t+2] Revenue Share [t+4] Expenditure Share [t+2] Expenditure Share [t+4] 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 






















Controls Country Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Country Specific Trends, Method Dummy, GDP per capita, Democratization (permanent) 
     
Observations 1039 999 998 962 
Countries 69 69 74 74 
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.34 0.42 0.33 
Note: Figures in parentheses give Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity, 
arbitrary intra-group correlation and cross-sectional dependence. All regressions control for country fixed effects, year fixed effects, country specific 
linear trends, method dummy and GDP per capita. The method dummy variable = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis, and 
0 if reported on cash basis. Revenue Share: subnational share of total government revenues (%). Expenditure Share: subnational share of total 
government expenditures (%). Resource Rent is defined as the total resource rents to GDP. Democratization=1 after democratization (i.e., Polity2 score 
turning positive). We consider ǲpermanentǳ democratization here whereby the treatments are not subsequently reversed. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. The Data Appendix describes all variables used.  
 
